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LABOR LAW
I. IMPLIED CONTRACT EXCEPTION TO EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE
APPLIED RETROACTIVELY
In Toth v. Square D Co.1 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that courts should give retroactive effect to the implied contract excep-
tion to the employment at will doctrine adopted in Small v. Springs
Industries, Inc.2 An employee whose employment was terminated
before June 8, 1987, the date of the Small decision, can now bring an
action for breach of contract based on provisions included in an em-
ployee handbook.
3
In Small an employer provided its employees with a handbook
that outlined the company's four-step procedure for the employer to
follow in an employee dismissal.4 The employer distributed bulletins
that described the procedure and assured the employees that they
would follow it. When the employer dismissed one of its employees,
however, the employer did not give the employee the benefit of the
progressive four-step procedure. The employee sued the employer for
breach of contract and claimed that the handbook, the bulletins, and
the employer's verbal assurances could be used as evidence against the
employer in the breach of contract action.5
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Small followed the majority
of states6 and held that "a jury can consider an employee handbook,
along with other evidence, deciding whether the employer and em-
ployee had a limiting agreement on the employee's at-will employment
status." The court, however, did not state explicitly that the decision
should be applied retroactively. Generally, when the South Carolina
Supreme Court holds that a decision applies prospectively only, the
1. 298 S.C. 6, 377 S.E.2d 584 (1989).
2. 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987).
3. See 298 S.C. at 7, 377 S.E.2d at 585 (certified question presented by South
Carolina District Court Judge Karen Henderson).
4. The four-step disciplinary process consisted of (1) a verbal reprimand, (2) a
written warning, (3) a final written warning, and (4) discharge. Small, 292 S.C. at 483,
357 S.E.2d at 453.
5. Id., 357 S.E.2d at 453-4.
6. See Annotation, Right to Discharge Allegedly "At-Will" Employee as Affected
By Employees Promulgation of Employment Policies as to Discharge, 33 AJL.R.4TH 120
(1984) (discusses implied contract exceptions to the employment at will doctrine).
7. Small, 292 S.C. at 486, 357 S.E.2d at 455.
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court states this in its opinion.8
In Toth the plaintiffs were employees who had been dismissed by
their employer prior to the date of the supreme court's decision in
Small. The plaintiffs sued the employer for breach of contract based
on the employer's violation of the provisions included in its employee
handbook. The employer moved for summary judgment and asserted
that the Small opinion could not be applied retroactively. In Toth the
South Carolina Supreme Court accepted certification from the district
court to answer the retroactivity question.9
The court in Toth stated that to limit the Small holding to pro-
spective application, it had to find that the decision "created a new
cause of action, with liability where none previously existed."10 The
court could not find a new cause of action and ruled that "[ilt is ele-
mentary that a cause of action for breach of contract is not a new
one."
11
Employers can argue that the retroactive application of the Small
decision unfairly penalizes them. The retroactive application of Small
in the employers' view substantially alters the doctrine of employment
at will and imposes contractual obligations on the employers which
they had not anticipated. Chief Justice Gregory argued in his dissent
in Toth that "Small created a new contractual right to recover which
should not be given retroactive effect. . . . The unfairness of imposing
a new contractual liability by law without notice is manifestly clear.'
2
Justice Finney, in a separate dissent, noted that "even if Small did not
create a new contractual right to recovery, it enormously expanded the
right to recover .... "13
"The use of employee handbook provisions in the construction of
an employment relationship is not a novel idea. In fact, introduction of
such provisions has previously been allowed in a pro-employer set-
ting.114 Also, at the time of the Toth decision, the supreme court al-
ready had given retroactive effect to the Small decision in a memoran-
dum opinion.15 Furthermore, the Toth decision follows an opinion from
8. See, e.g., Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 225-26, 337
S.E.2d 213, 216 (1985).
9. Toth, 298 S.C. at 7-8, 377 S.E.2d at 585.
10. Id. at 8, 377 S.E.2d at 585.
11. Id. at 9, 377 S.E.2d at 586.
12. Id. at 11, 377 S.E.2d at 587 (Gregory, C.J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 12, 377 S.E.2d at 587 (Finney, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 9, 377 S.E.2d at 586 (emphasis in original); see also Dew v. City of Flo-
rence, 279 S.C. 155, 160-61, 303 S.E.2d 664, 666-67 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936
(1983); Hogsed v. Lancaster Area Schools Bd. of Trustees, 283 S.C. 42, 47, 320 S.E.2d
724, 727 (Ct. App. 1984).
15. Francisco v. Black River Elec. Coop., No. 87-MO-325, mem. op. (S.C. July 27,
1987). A memorandum opinion has no precedential value. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. 23.
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another jurisdiction.'6
Strong policy reasons exist to support retroactive application of
the Small decision. The supreme court does not want employers to
mislead employees with provisions in their employee handbooks while
reserving the right as employers to deviate from the handbook provi-
sions at their discretion.17 In the court's view, improved employee atti-
tudes and improved quality in the workforce arise when the employ-
ment relationship is spelled out in a handbook, and, therefore, it would
be unjust to allow an employer to couch a handbook in mandatory
terms and then allow the employer to ignore these policies whenever it
is advantageous to him."8 In Toth the supreme court reasoned that em-
ployers themselves create contractual obligations through their
promises made in employee handbooks, and, therefore, they cannot be
allowed to retract their promises and ignore the handbooks they have
drafted. 19 Because of the Toth holding, employees now can reasonably
believe that company policies outlined in printed company materials
will be honored by the company as the terms and conditions of
employment.
Employers who fear liability, however, may feel compelled to re-
tain unfit employees. Also, litigation may increase substantially in this
area, which creates disharmony in the workplace and financial stress
for South Carolina businesses. Also, the Toth decision may create a
disincentive for businesses to move their operations to South Carolina.
Chief Justice Gregory argued in his dissent in Small that the Small
holding "tends to stifle quality economic growth and development and
hinder expanded job opportunities in this State."' The Toth holding
may aggravate whatever economic burdens resulted from the Small
decision.
The Toth decision, however, is fair and prudent. Although the
South Carolina Supreme Court cut back on the employment at will
doctrine in South Carolina in the Small and Toth decisions, it has
done so within the existing principles of contract law."' Employers are
16. See Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, Ltd., 231 N.J. Super. 81, 555 A.2d 12
(App. Div. 1989). Preston retroactively applied the decision in Woolley v. Hoffmann-La
Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985), in
which the court held that provisions in an employee handbook can be construed as con-
tractual. Preston, 231 N.J. Super. at 84, 555 A.2d at 14.
17. See Small, 292 S.C. at 485, 357 S.E.2d at 454; Walker v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 77 N.C. App. 253, 259, 335 S.E.2d 79, 83 (1985).
18. Small, 292 S.C. at 485, 357 S.E.2d at 454-55; see also Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 619, 292 N.W.2d 880, 895 (1980).
19. Toth, 298 S.C. at 9, 377 S.E.2d at 586.
20. Small, 292 S.C. at 488, 357 S.E.2d at 456 (Gregory, C.J., dissenting).
21. Toth, 298 S.C. at 9, 377 S.E.2d at 586; see also Toth v. Square D Co., 712 F.
Supp. 1231 (D.S.C. 1989). The district court held that the implied contract exception is
1990]
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under no obligation to print terms and conditions of employment in
employee handbooks and other materials,22 but if they do so in South
Carolina, they will be held to their promises.
Matthew J. Norton
II. PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION NOT EXPANDED TO EMPLOYMENT AT
WILL DOCTRINE
In Miller v. Fairfield Communities, Inc.13 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals held that the public policy exception to the employ-
ment at will doctrine applies only when the employer requires the em-
ployee to violate a law, which would subject the employee to criminal
sanctions, as a condition of his employment .2  The court of appeals,
however, called upon the South Carolina Supreme Court to consider
whether the public policy exception should be expanded.25
Fairfield Communities, Inc. (Fairfield) employed Ronald Miller as
a golf professional at its Edisto Island resort. Fairfield claimed that
Mr. Miller had a conflict of interest because his wife, Jan Miller, was a
real estate agent for a competitor of Fairfield. Fairfield complained
that Mr. Miller allowed his wife's customers to use the Fairfield golf
course. Fairfield demanded that Mr. Miller either resign or force his
wife to leave her employment. In response to the demand, Mr. Miller
resigned.2
Mr. and Mrs. Miller sued Fairfield for wrongful discharge, viola-
tion of the Unfair Trade Practice's Act, and tortious interference with
Mrs. Miller's employment contract.2 7 The Millers specifically claimed
that if Mrs. Miller quit her job, she would have to transfer her real
estate listings to another brokerage firm without her employer's con-
sent in violation of South Carolina Code section 40-57-170(7).2" The
Millers also claimed that Fairfield required Mr. Miller to interfere with
his wife's contractual relationships with her customers.29 Furthermore,
based on a unilateral employment agreement. The district court also rejected the notion
that an employer can later modify the unilateral agreement, as a miatter of law, by issu-
ing a revised handbook that contains a disclaimer of intent to create contractual rights.
Id. at 1234.
22. Small, 292 S.C. at 481, 357 S.E.2d at 454.
23. 299 S.C. 23, 382 S.E.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1989).
24. Id. at 26, 382 S.E.2d at 18.
25. Id. at 26-27, 382 S.E.2d at 19.
26. Id. at 24-25, 382 S.E.2d at 17-18.
27. Id. at 25, 382 S.E.2d at 18.
28. Id. at 26, 382 S.E.2d at 18.
29. Id. at 27-28, 382 S.E.2d at 19.
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the Millers claimed that when Fairfield asked Mrs. Miller to quit her
job, it violated the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act.s0
At trial the court dismissed with prejudice the Millers' tortious in-
terference claim.31 The court granted Fairfield's motion for summary
judgment on the issues of wrongful discharge and unfair trade practice.
On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals found no basis for
Miller's allegations in either claim.
The court noted that, at most, the Millers might be subject to ad-
ministrative sanctions.3 2 The court declined to expand the public pol-
icy exception to cover a threat of administrative sanctions. The court
of appeals, however, relied on its decision in Ludwick v. This Minute
of Carolina, Inc.33 and declined to apply the public policy exception
outside the sphere of criminal sanctions.84 The court, however, called
upon the South Carolina Supreme Court to consider this question."
Under the employment at will doctrine employees may be dis-
missed with or without cause.38 The doctrine has begun to erode, how-
ever, because the legislature has implemented prohibitions against dis-
missal on the basis of sex, age, religion, color, and being handicapped.37
The South Carolina Supreme Court further eroded the doctrine in
Ludwick when it held that although at-will employment would remain
the law in South Carolina, if the retaliatory discharge violated a clear
mandate of public policy, the fired employee would have a cause of
action in tort for wrongful discharge. 38 The supreme court declined to
determine the scope of the public policy exception, but noted that "the
threat of retaliation for refusing [to violate the law] is intolerable and
impermissible."39 In Miller the court of appeals interpreted the Lud-
wick opinion as restricting the public policy exception to criminal vio-
lations and declined to expand its scope.40
In Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co.41 an employee brought an ac-
30. Id. at 28, 382 S.E.2d at 19.
31. Id. at 25, 382 S.E.2d at 18.
32. Id. at 27, 382 S.E.2d at 19.
33. 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213 (1985).
34. Miller, 299 S.C. at 26-27, 382 S.E.2d at 19.
35. Id. at 27, 382 S.E.2d at 19.
36. Smalls v. Springs Indus., Inc., - S.C. -, 388 S.E.2d 808 (1990).
37. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-80 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989) (unlawful em-
ployment practices); Id. §§ 43-33-530, -540, -570 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
38. Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 224-25, 337 S.E.2d 213,
216 (1985). In Ludwick an employer fired an employee for honoring a subpoena to ap-
pear at a State Employment Security Commission hearing. Id. at 221, 337 S.E.2d at 213-
14.
39. Id. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 216.
40. Miller, 299 S.C. at 26-27, 382 S.E.2d at 19.
41. 273 S.C. 766, 259 S.E.2d 812 (1979).
1990]
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tion against his employer for retaliatory discharge. The South Carolina
Supreme Court noted that the public policy exception had been recog-
nized in a minority of jurisdictions,42 but would not apply the excep-
tion to Hudson's case.
43
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that an employee may not
be terminated for a refusal to engage in illegal conduct that could sub-
ject them to a civil penalty. For example, such conduct would include a
refusal to act in restraint of trade,44 a refusal to violate consumer pro-
tection laws," and a refusal to violate environmental protection laws.
46
Courts less frequently have recognized a public policy exception if an
employee refuses to violate administrative regulations or ethical
codes.'7
Other states, along with South Carolina, cautiously have examined
and applied the public policy exception to the employment at will doc-
trine.'8 If the South Carolina Supreme Court rules on the question of
expanding the public policy exception, it is doubtful that any major
changes will result.
Charles F. Thompson, Jr.
III. STATE LAW OUTRAGE CLAIMS NOT ExEMPT FROM SECTION 301
PREEMPTION
In Nash v. AT&T Nassau Metals'9 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that a suit brought by an employee against his employer for
intentional infliction of emotional distress5" is not automatically im-
mune from preemption under section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA).5 1 The court, however, stated that a case-by-
42. Id. at 769, 259 S.E.2d at 813.
43. Id. at 770, 259 S.E.2d at 813.
44. See, e.g., Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (em-
ployees fired because they exposed unlawful price discounts).
45. See, e.g., Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978)
(bank employee fired for asking employer to comply with consumer protection laws).
46. See, e.g., Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Co., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987) (em-
ployee refused to dispense leaded gas into car that used unleaded).
47. See, e.g., Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728 (1982)
(pharmacist fired for refusal to close business on a holiday).
48. J. Kauff & H. Silverstein, Recent developments in the Law of Unjust Dismis-
sal, 4 PRACTiCING LAW INST. 9 (1988).
49. 298 S.C. 428, 381 S.E.2d 206 (1989).
50. In South Carolina this action is also known as the tort of outrage or outrageous
conduct and is described in Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157, 276 S.E.2d 776 (1981).
51. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988) states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
[Vol. 42
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case analysis is necessary to determine whether the resolution of a par-
ticular state law tort claim requires the court to interpret a collective
bargaining agreement between a unionized employee and his employer.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals had stated in its Nash opinion
that "the tort of [intentional infliction of emotional distress], when
arising in the context of a labor-related contract, [has] . . .at most
only a tangential connection with the contract '52 and is not preempted
by section 301. The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, granted
AT&T Nassau Metals' (Nassau) petition for certiorari, reversed the
court of appeals, and clarified the relationship between a state law tort
claim for outrage and section 301 of the LMRA.
In 1980 William Nash, an employee of Nassau and a member of
the Communications Workers of America (the CWA), suffered two in-
juries at work. As a result of these injuries, Nash underwent surgery
and received psychiatric treatment for depression. Workers' compensa-
tion benefits covered his medical expenses. In December 1982 Nassau
offered to settle Nash's workers' compensation claim for $30,000 and to
pay all of his nonpsychiatric expenses for one year. Nassau conditioned
its offer on Nash's resignation and agreement to release the company
from all of his future expenses. Nash declined to settle.53
Nassau filed an application to stop payment of compensation with
the South Carolina Industrial Commission. The hearing on Nassau's
application resulted in a court order in Nash's favor. In May 1985 Nas-
sau chose a doctor and scheduled two appointments for Nash. It is un-
clear whether Nassau notified Nash or his attorney that it was exercis-
ing its rights under the collective bargaining agreement to schedule
these appointments.5 Nash did not go to the doctors that Nassau
chose. In a letter dated July 18, 1985, Nassau informed Nash that, be-
cause he refused to observe the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement, which required Nash to consult with a physician of Nas-
sau's choice, Nassau had terminated Nash's employment effective June
1, 1985. Nassau also notified Nash on July 19, 1985, that Nash's group
insurance benefits would end on the last day of the month in which he
was terminated, but that he could convert to nongroup insurance
within thirty-one days. Because of a misunderstanding about the date
by which he had to convert his insurance, Nash let the coverage
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizen-
ship of the parties.
52. Nash v. AT&T Nassau Metals, 294 S.C. 248, 256, 363 S.E.2d 695, 700 (Ct. App.
1987) (per curiam), rev'd, 298 S.C. 428, 381 S.E.2d 206 (1989).
53. Nash, 298 S.C. at 429-30, 381 S.E.2d at 207.
54. Id. at 430, 381 S.E.2d at 207.
1990]
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lapse. 5 Nash's Union, the CWA, requested arbitration of the matter,56
but Nassau and the CWA reached an agreement before the issue was
arbitrated. Nassau reinstated Nash retroactively and reimbursed his
medical expenses under the benefit plans in the collective agreement.
57
In February 1986 Nash brought this action against Nassau and al-
leged (1) tortious interference with a contractual relationship, (2)
fraudulent breach of an employment contract, (3) intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and (4) wrongful termination. The trial court dis-
missed the action with prejudice and granted summary judgment for
Nassau on all four claims.
58
Nash appealed on only two of his claims, (1) tortious interference
with a contractual relationship, and (2) intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dis-
missal of the tortious interference claim because section 301 of the
LMRA preempted it. The court of appeals reversed the lower court's
dismissal of Nash's claim for outrage, however, because it held that the
claim was only tangentially connected with the labor contract and,
therefore, section 301 did not preempt it. e The court remanded the
case to the trial court to resolve the factual disputes on the outrage
claim.60
Nassau petitioned the South Carolina Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari to determine (1) whether federal law preempted the outrage
claim, and (2) whether the court could grant relief on Nash's claim of
outrage. The supreme court granted certiorari and reversed the court
of appeals on the preemption issue. The supreme court held that sec-
tion 301 of the LMRA preempted the outrage claim. As a result, the
court did not determine whether Nash had stated a claim for which it
could grant relief.61
The supreme court applied the test enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck6 2 to determine
whether section 301 of the LMRA preempted Nash's outrage claim. "If
55. The confusion could have been caused in part by a conversation Nash had with
someone at the insurance company, but this confusion does not appear to have been
caused by Nassau. Id. at 431 n.1, 381 S.E.2d at 207 n.1.
56. Nash stated that he was unaware of the CWA's arbitration request until the
trial court's summary judgment hearing on May 12, 1986. Id. at 431, 381 S.E.2d at 208.
57. Nash v. AT&T Nassau Metals, 294 S.C. 248, 252-53, 363 S.E.2d 695, 698 (Ct.
App. 1987), rev'd, 298 S.C. 428, 381 S.E.2d 206 (1989).
58. Nash v. AT&T Nassau Metals, 298 S.C. 428, 431, 381 S.E.2d 206, 208 (1989).
59. Nash, 294 S.C. at 256, 363 S.E.2d at 700 (court of appeals' decision).
60. Id., 363 S.E.2d at 701.
61. Nash, 298 S.C. at 431, 381 S.E.2d at 208. The crux of Nash's outrage claim was
that "Nassau was purposefully vague and intentionally created a situation whereby
Nash's failure to comply with the contract was inevitable." Id. at 435, 381 S.E.2d at 210.
62. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
[Vol. 42
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the state tort law purports to define the meaning of the [collective bar-
gaining] contract relationship, that law is preempted. 6 3 The Allis-
Chalmers test requires courts to examine "whether the state claim ex-
ists independently of the collective bargaining agreement or whether it
is 'inextricably intertwined' with a consideration of the terms of the
agreement."'" The United States Supreme Court emphasized that a
plaintiff's choice to proceed in tort rather than in contract would not
avoid preemption of the claim.63
The Court in Alllis-Chalmers, however, narrowed the breadth of
its holding in several significant ways. First, the Court exempted pri-
vate labor agreements from preemption under section 301 of the
LIRA.6" Second, the Court stated that Congress did not intend "to
preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obli-
gations, independent of a labor contract. '6 7 Finally, the Court noted
that the rights that exist independently of a labor contract may be
waived or altered by agreement.66
The South Carolina Supreme Court relied on Allis-Chalmers to
challenge the court of appeals' opinion that Nash's outrage claim auto-
matically was immune from section 301 preemption. 9 The court of ap-
peals cited its earlier decision in Butts v. AVX Corp.70 and held that in
the context of a collective bargaining agreement, "the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, when arising in the context of a
63. Id. at 213. Once section 301 preempts a state law claim, the court must either
dismiss it or treat it as a claim that arises under section 301. See id. at 220.
64. Nash, 298 S.C. at 432, 381 S.E.2d at 208 (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at
213). Because each collective bargaining agreement may be different, this analysis must
be on a case-by-case basis. See Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220.
65. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211. The court stated:
Thus, questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and
what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agree-
ment, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such
questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleg-
ing liability in tort. Any other result would elevate form over substance and
allow parties to evade the requirements of § 301 by relabeling their contract
claims as claims for tortious breach of contract.
Id.
66. Id. at 211-12. See also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1987)
(employees sued employer for breach of individual employment contracts, and employees
claims not barred by section 301).
67. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 212 (footnote omitted).
68. Id. at 213. In a later case, the Court defined "independent" to mean that "reso-
lution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agree-
ment." Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407 (1988) (footnote
omitted).
69. Nash v. AT&T Nassau Metals, 298 S.C. 428, 432-34, 381 S.E.2d 206, 208-09
(1989).
70. 292 S.C. 256, 355 S.E.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1987).
1990]
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labor related contract, has at most only a tangential connection with
the contract and is not preempted by § 301." 71 The supreme court
noted, however, that the court of appeals failed to decide the preemp-
tion question on an ad hoc basis, and, thereby, ignored not only the
United States Supreme Court's requirement set forth in Allis-Chal-
mers,7 2 but also the court of appeals' own directive in Butts.
7 3
Nash claimed that Nassau had fired him intentionally to deprive
him of his benefits under Nassau's contract with the CWA. Nassau re-
sponded that it was exercising its contractual right to require an em-
ployee who claims an injury to consult a physician that Nassau chooses
and to terminate the employee's benefits and employment if the em-
ployee fails to cooperate.74 To resolve the parties' contradictory posi-
tions, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that Nash essen-
tially was alleging that Nassau had abused the procedures it agreed
upon in its contract with the CWA.7 5 The court then observed that to
determine whether Nassau had abused the procedures it would need to
decide whether the parties had complied with the collective bargaining
agreement. 76 Because the compliance issue required the supreme court
to interpret the facts that surrounded Nassau's contract with the
CWA, the supreme court held that section 301 preempted Nash's
claim.7 7 The supreme court, however, declined to decide whether Nash
had stated a claim for outrage and vacated the decision of the court of
appeals on that claim.7s
The supreme court's opinion in Nash demonstrates how state law
interacts with the body of evolving federal labor law in cases in which a
court interprets the preemption issue under section 301.79 Although in
71. Nash, 298 S.C. at 433, 381 S.E.2d at 208-09.
72. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985) (court must look at
preemptive effect of federal labor-contract law on a case-by-case basis).
73. 298 S.C. at 433, 381 S.E.2d at 209. In Nash the supreme court cited a number
of cases in which the court applied the requisite case-by-case analysis to determine
whether section 301 preempted the state law claims. Id. at 432-33 n.3, 381 S.E.2d 208-09
n.3,
74. Id. at 434, 381 S.E.2d at 209.
75. Id. at 434-35, 381 S.E.2d at 209-10.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 435, 381 S.E.2d at 210.
78. Id. A recent Fourth Circuit decision has held, however, that a federal district
court has the discretion to dismiss state claims on the merits before reaching the pre-
emption issue. Washington v. Union Carbide Corp., 870 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir. 1989).
79. Section 301 preemption should be distinguished from two other types of federal
labor law preemption (along with preemption under other federal laws). The first type of
preemption protects the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board over
practices listed in sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act. See, e.g., Farmer
v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290,
296-97 (1977), (NLRA indicates compelling congressional direction for preemption). The
[Vol. 42
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Butts the South Carolina Court of Appeals correctly applied the Allis-
Chalmers test when it determined that section 301 did not require pre-
emption, that same court erred in its analysis in Nash. In Nash, there-
fore, the South Carolina Supreme Court refined the application of Al-
lis-Chalmers to assure that South Carolina courts will follow federal
labor law directives. Furthermore, the court's opinion in Nash is a
good example of how a state court follows the United States Supreme
Court's directive that "[t]he full scope of the pre-emptive effect of fed-
eral labor-contract law remains to be fleshed out on a case-by-case
basis."80
Kendall R. Walker
IV. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIM PERMITTED UNDER TITLE
VII
In Paroline v. Unisys Corp."1 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
permitted a "hostile work environment" claim under Title VII of the
other type of preemption deals with "[labor] conduct that Congress intended to be un-
regulated." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 749 (1985). Accord
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212 n.6 (preemption under sections 7 and 8
of the NLRA). See generally Schwartz & Parrot, A New Look at Federal Labor Law
Preemption: Unionized Employees' Claims in State Court, 7 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV.
297 (1988) (thorough discussion of the three federal labor law preemption doctrines);
Baxter & Alter, Preemption of State Law Causes of Action: Recent Developments, 14
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 407 (1988) (article examines recent federal decisions that focus on
preemption of state actions by federal labor laws).
The United States Supreme Court set the general course of federal labor law under
section 301 in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The Court
emphasized in Lincoln Mills that Congress intended for federal courts to apply section
301 and fashion a body of federal law to govern suits that alleged violations of labor
contracts. Id. at 450-51. The Court in Lincoln Mills also expressed its commitment to
arbitration as the preferred solution to labor problems. Id. at 454-55. The Court has
noted the need for a uniform federal law to interpret labor contracts:
The possibility that individual contract terms might have different mean-
ings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence
upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements ...
Indeed, the existence of possibly conflicting legal concepts might substantially
impede the parties' willingness to agree to contract terms providing for final
arbitral or judicial resolution of dispute.
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 102, 103-04 (1962).
During the same term that it announced Lucas Flour Co., the Court ruled that state
courts had concurrent jurisdiction over section 301 claims. Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). Finally the court held that section 301 preempts a state
law tort claim when a court must interpret a collective bargaining agreement to resolve
the claim. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
80. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 220.
81. 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990).
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Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The court identified two material issues of
fact that precluded summary judgment for the defendants. First, a jury
could reasonably conclude that Paroline, or a reasonable person in sim-
ilar circumstances, could believe that a hostile and abusive work envi-
ronment existed.83 Second, the court believed that the plaintiff had ad-
vanced sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment on her two
theories for imputing liability to her employer for sexual harassment.
The case is significant because the Fourth Circuit incorporated the
Sixth Circuit's approach to hostile work environment cases, which is, a
plaintiff must satisfy a subjective-objective test to demonstrate sexual
harassment.
8
4
Unisys Corporation employed Elizabeth Paroline as a word proces-
sor in 1986. Edgar L. Moore, a Unisys employee and co-defendant in
this case, participated in Paroline's interview. Prior to Paroline's em-
ployment, several clerical employees at Unisys complained that Moore
and other male employees improperly made sexual comments and im-
properly touched female employees. Management met with the male
employees and warned them to cease behavior that could be construed
as sexual harassment. Management also met privately with Moore. 5
After Paroline began working at Unisys, Moore allegedly specifi-
cally focused his attention toward her. One evening Moore gave
Paroline a ride home after the plant closed because of a snowstorm.
Paroline alleged that despite protests, Moore made suggestive com-
ments and kissed her. She further alleged that Moore accompanied her
to her apartment against her will and, in spite of repeated protests,
continued to kiss and touch her. Paroline eventually persuaded Moore
to leave.86
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). "[I]t shall be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
83. The plaintiff also alleged (1) constructive discharge under Title VII, (2) pen-
dent state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, (3) a claim against
Moore for assault and battery, and (4) claims against Unisys for negligent failure to warn
and reckless endangerment. Although the constructive discharge claim initially survived
summary judgment on appeal before a Fourth Circuit panel, the Fourth Circuit vacated
the original decision in an en banc rehearing of this issue. Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 900
F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc). The parties agreed to a voluntary dismissal of the
assault and battery claim and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's grant of sum-
mary judgment on all other claims. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 102.
84. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 106-08 (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co. 805 F.2d 611,
620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987)).
85. Id. at 103. Because the district court had granted Paroline's motion for sum-
mary judgment, the Fourth Circuit accepted the allegations she raised in her complaint.
Id. at 102.03.
86. Id. at 103.
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Paroline reported the incident to Unisys management the next
day. Unisys conducted an investigation, which resulted in a written
warning to Moore, instructions that Moore seek counseling, and termi-
nation of Moore's access to the secured portion of the building.
Paroline considered her employer's actions inadequate. She resigned
and filed a sexual harassment suit under Title VII against both Unisys
and Moore.87 The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision
to grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the Title
VII sexual harassment claim.
88
In Paroline the court reaffirmed the four-part test it outlined in
Swentek v. USAir, Inc.89 to determine whether a hostile environment
exists in a sexual harassment claim under Title VII. The plaintiff must
show "(1) that the conduct in question was unwelcome, (2) that the
harassment was based on sex, (3) that the harassment was sufficiently
pervasive or severe to create an abusive working environment, and (4)
that some basis exists for imputing liability to the employer.90 More-
over, the Paroline court stated that the plaintiff would have to satisfy
a subjective-objective standard of proof to show that "the'harassment
was sufficiently severe or pervasive" under the second part of the
test. 1
The subjective-objective test requires a plaintiff to demonstrate
that the harassment subjectively interfered with the employee's work
or significantly affected her psychological well being. 2 Second, after
the plaintiff satisfies the subjective test, she needs to satisfy an objec-
tive test that indicates that "the harassment would interfere with the
work performance or significantly affect the psychologcal well-being of
a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position.
'93
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson94 the United States Supreme
Court held that sexual harassment, which creates a hostile work envi-
ronment, may give rise to a claim under Title VII. The Court, however,
did not specify the standard of proof that the plaintiff must meet in a
Title VII claim. A majority of jurisdictions have adopted a "but for"
test, which requires the fact finder to determine that the alleged har-
87. Id.
88. Id. at 103-04.
89. 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987).
90. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 105 (citing Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th
Cir. 1987)).
91. Id. (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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assment would not have occurred but for the victim's gender.95 The
subjective-objective standard adopted by the Paroline court, which is
usually applied in cases with constructive discharge claims under Title
VII,°6 is a minority approach.
The second issue in Paroline concerned imputing liability to the
employer in a Title VII "hostile work environment" claim. Paroline ad-
vanced two theories that imputed liability to Unisys for Moore's con-
duct. First, Paroline argued that Unisys failed to take adequate reme-
dial action after Paroline complained about Moore's conduct. Second,
Paroline argued that Moore's prior conduct put Unisys on notice and
imposed a duty on Unisys to prevent further sexual harassment.
9 7
The Fourth Circuit primarily relied on two sources to justify a
duty to prevent foreseeable harassment. First, the court noted that,
although courts previously have focused on after-the-fact remedial ac-
tions taken by the employer, "[p]revention is generally more efficacious
than cure."9' 8 Second, the court supported its decision by relying on its
reasoning in Katz v. Dole"9 and Swentek v. USAir, Inc.100
In both Katz and Swentek the court stated that a plaintiff must
establish that the employer took no remedial steps even though the
employer knew or should have known of the unwelcome conduct.
Paroline makes clear that a plaintiff may establish the employer's lia-
bility by showing that the objectionable conduct existed prior to the
complained of incident. The plaintiff may accomplish this by examin-
ing prior complaints by other employees and the employer's subse-
quent remedial actions. This is not only consistent with Katz and
Swentek, but also extends the rule in those cases.
The extent of the employer's duty, however, remains unclear. For
example, in Swentek the court recognized that the employer need not
"credit all of [the complainant's] allegations in order to escape liabil-
ity" when the employer takes remedial action.10 2 If plaintiffs are al-
lowed to rely on prior notice to the employer, courts will have to in-
quire into the nature of the previous complaints, the subjective
95. See, e.g., Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987); Rabidue v. Osceola
Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Henson v. City
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Porta v. Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc., 654 F.
Supp. 1275 (D.N.J. 1987), aff'd, 845 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1988); Barbetta v. Chemlawn
Servw. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
96. See Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1082 (1986).
97. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 106.
98. Id. at 107.
99. 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (air traffic controller claiming hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment).
100. 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987) (flight attendant alleging sexual harassment).
101. Id. at 558.
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reaction of the complaining party, and the effect the employer's reme-
dial action would have on future complaints if the remedial action
failed to end the harassment. Thus, the employer would be forced to
consider not only the complaining party's reaction, but also what a rea-
sonable employee's response would have been.
The subjective-objective test and the duty of prevention are com-
patible standards. For a plaintiff to succeed, she must show that the
harassment would have interfered with the work of a "reasonable" per-
son in the plaintiff's position. Likewise, the duty of prevention makes
the employer consider the reaction of a reasonable person in the plain-
tiff's position when the employer takes remedial action. By adopting
the Sixth Circuit's subjective-objective test, the Fourth Circuit adds to
the plaintiff's burden by requiring her to show that it was reasonable
to expect that the harassment would interfere with her work. On the
other hand, the plaintiff may rely on the employer's duty to prevent
foreseeable sexual harassment. Employers should be aware of this duty
and recognize that previous complaints and remedial action may be
used in subsequent Title VII claims. Consequently, employers will have
to handle sexual harassment claims at an early stage to avoid breach-
ing the duty to prevent foreseeable sexual harassment.
Ellen A. Mercer
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